Abstract. This paper presents a new privacy-preserving smart metering system. Our scheme is private under the differential privacy model and therefore provides strong and provable guarantees. With our scheme, an (electricity) supplier can periodically collect data from smart meters and derive aggregated statistics without learning anything about the activities of individual households. For example, a supplier cannot tell from a user's trace whether or when he watched TV or turned on heating. Our scheme is simple, efficient and practical. Processing cost is very limited: smart meters only have to add noise to their data and encrypt the results with an efficient stream cipher.
Introduction
Several countries throughout the world are planning to deploy smart meters in households in the very near future. The main motivation, for governments and electricity suppliers, is to be able to match consumption with generation. Traditional electrical meters only measure total consumption on a given period of time (i.e., one month or one year). As such, they do not provide accurate information of when the energy was consumed. Smart meters, instead, monitor and report consumption in intervals of few minutes. They allow the utility provider to monitor, almost in real-time, consumption and possibly adjust generation and prices according to the demand. Billing customers by how much is consumed and at what time of day will probably change consumption habits to help matching consumption with generation. In the longer term, with the advent of smart appliances, it is expected that the smart grid will remotely control selected appliances to reduce demand.
Problem statement: Although smart metering might help improving energy management, it creates many new privacy problems [2] . Smart meters provide very accurate consumption data to electricity providers. As the interval of data collected by smart meters decreases, the ability to disaggregate low-resolution data increases. Analyzing highresolution consumption data, Nonintrusive Appliance Load Monitoring (NALM) [11] can be used to identify a remarkable number of electric appliances (e.g., water heaters, well pumps, furnace blowers, refrigerators, and air conditioners) employing exhaustive appliance signature libraries. Researchers are now focusing on the myriad of small electric devices around the home such as personal computers, laser printers, and light bulbs [14] . Moreover, it has also been shown that even simple off-the-shelf statistical tools can be used to extract complex usage patterns from high-resolution consumption data [15] . This extracted information can be used to profile and monitor users for various purposes, creating serious privacy risks and concerns. As data recorded by smart meters is lowering in resolution, and inductive algorithms are quickly improving, it is urgent to develop privacy-preserving smart metering systems that provide strong and provable guarantees.
Contributions:
We propose a privacy-preserving smart metering scheme that guarantees users' privacy while still preserving the benefits and promises of smart metering. Our contributions are many-fold and summarized as follows:
-We provide the first provably private and distributed solution for smart metering that optimizes utility without relying on a trusted third party (i.e., an aggregator).
We were able to avoid the use of a trusted third party by proposing a new distributed Laplacian Perturbation Algorithm (DLPA). In our scheme, smart meters are grouped into clusters, where a cluster is a group of hundreds or thousands of smart meters corresponding, for example, to a quarter of a city. Each smart meter sends, at each sampling period, their measures to the supplier. These measures are noised and encrypted such that the supplier can compute the noised aggregated electricity consumption of the cluster, at each sampling period, without getting access to individual values. The aggregate is noised just enough to provide differential privacy to each participating user, while still providing high utility (i.e., low error). Our scheme is secure under the differential privacy model and therefore provides strong and provable privacy guarantees. In particular, we guarantee that the supplier can retrieve information about any user consumption only up to a predefined threshold, no matter what auxiliary information it knows about that user. Our scheme is simple, efficient and practical. It requires either one or two rounds of message exchanges between a meter and the supplier. Furthermore, processing cost is very limited: smart meters only have to add noise to their data and encrypt the results with an efficient stream cipher. Finally, our scheme is robust against smart meter failures and malicious nodes. More specifically, it is secure even if an α fraction of all nodes of a cluster collude with the supplier, where α is a security parameter. -We implemented a new electricity trace generation tool based on [19] which generates realistic, one-minute resolution synthetic consumption data of different households. We used this simulator to evaluate the performance and privacy of our proposal.
Because of space constraint, the security analysis of our scheme is not included in this paper. This analysis is however included in the longer version of this paper [1] . This extended version also includes additional performance results.
Related Work
Several papers addressed the privacy problems of smart metering in the recent past [8, 15, 2, 16, 3, 4, 18, 10] . However, only a few of them have proposed technical solutions to protect users' privacy. In [2, 3] , the authors discuss the different security aspects of smart metering and the conflicting interests among stakeholders. The privacy of billing is considered in [18, 15] . Seemingly, the privacy of monitoring the sum consumption of multiple users may be solved by simply anonymizing individual measurements like in [8] or using some mixnet. However, these "ad-hoc" techniques are dangerous and do not provide any real assurances of privacy. Several prominent examples in the history have shown that ad-hoc methods do not work [12] . Moreover, these techniques require an existing trusted third party who performs anonymization. The authors in [4] perturb the released aggregate with random noise and use a different model from ours to analyze the privacy of their scheme. However, they do not encrypt individual measurements which means that the added noise must be large enough to guarantee reasonable privacy. As individual noise shares sum up at the aggregation, the final noise makes the aggregate useless. In contrast to this, [10] uses homomorphic encryption to guarantee privacy for individual measurements. However, the aggregate is not perturbed which means that it is not differential private.
Three closely related works to ours are [17, 20, 6] . [6] describes protocols for generating shares of random noise which is secure against malicious participants. However, it requires communication between users and it uses expensive secret sharing techniques resulting in high overhead in case of large number of users. In [17] , the authors propose a scheme to differential privately aggregate sums over multiple slots when the aggregator is untrusted. However, they use the threshold Paillier cryptosystem [9] for homomorphic encryption which is much more expensive compared to [5] that we use. They also use different noise distribution technique which requires several rounds of message exchanges between the users and the aggregator. By contrast, our solution is much more efficient and simple: it requires only a single message exchange if there are no node failures, otherwise, we only need one extra round. In addition, our solution does not rely on expensive public key cryptography during aggregation.
A recent paper [20] proposes another technique to privately aggregate time series data. This work differs from ours as follows: (1) they use a Diffie-Hellman-based encryption scheme, whereas our construction is based on a more efficient construction that only use modular additions. This approach is better adapted to resource constrained devices like smart meters. (2) Although [20] does not require the establishment (and storage) of pairwise keys between nodes as opposed to our approach, it is unclear how [20] can be extended to tolerate node and communication failures. By contrast, our scheme is more robust, as the encryption key of non-responding nodes is known to other nodes in the network that can help to recover the aggregate. (3) Finally, [20] uses a different noise generation method from ours, but this technique only satisfies the relaxed (ε, δ)-differential privacy definition. Indeed, in their scheme, each node adds noise probabilistically which means that none of the nodes add noise with some positive probability δ. Although δ can be arbitrarily small, this also decreases the utility. By contrast, in our scheme, δ = 0 while ensuring nearly optimal utility.
The model

Network model
The network is composed of four major parts: the supplier/aggregator, the electricty distribution network, the communication network, and the users (customers). Every user is equipped with an electricity smart meter, which measures the electricity consumption of the user in every T p long period, and, using the communication network, sends the measurement to the aggregator at the end of every slot (in practice, T p is around 1-30 minutes). Note that the communication and distribution network can be the same (e.g., when PLC technology is used to transfer data). The measurement of user i in slot t is denoted by X i t . The consumption profile of user i is described by the vector
. Privacy directly correlates with T p ; finer-grained samples means more accurate profile, but also entails weaker privacy. The supplier is interested in the sum of all measurements in every slot (i.e.,
As in [4] , we also assume that smart meters are trusted devices (i.e., tamper-resistant) which can store key materials and perform crypto computations. This realistic assumption has also been confirmed in [3] . We assume that each node is configured with a private key and gets the corresponding certificate from a trusted third party. For example, each country might have a third party that generates these certificate and can additionally generate the "supplier" certificates to supplier companies [3] . As in [3] , we also assume that public key operations are employed only for initial key establishment, probably when a meter is taken over by a new supplier. Messages exchanged between the supplier and the meters are authenticated using pairwise MACs 1 . Smart meters are assumed to have bidirectional communication channel (using some wireless or PLC technology) with the aggregator, but the meters cannot communicate with each other. We suppose that nodes may (randomly) fail, and in these cases, cannot send their measurements to the aggregator. However, nodes are supposed to use some reliable transport protocol to overcome the transient communication failures of the channel. Finally, we note that smart meters also allow the supplier to perform fine-grained billing based on time-dependant variable tariffs. Here, we are not concerned with the privacy and security problems of this service. Interested readers are referred to [18, 15] .
Adversary model
In general, the objective of the adversary is to infer detailed information about household activity (e.g, how many people are in home and what they are doing at a given time). In order to do that, it needs to extract complex usage patterns of appliances which include the level of power consumption, periodicity, and duration.
In this paper we consider a dishonest-but-non-intrusive (DN) adversary. A DN adversary may not follow the protocol correctly and is allowed to provide false information to manipulate the collected data. He may also collude with some (malicious) smart meters. However, he is not allowed to access or modify the distribution network to mount attacks. In particular, he is not allowed to install wiretapping devices to eavesdrop on the victim's consumption.
Privacy model
We use differential privacy [7] that models the adversary described above. In particular, differential privacy guarantees that a user's privacy should not be threatened substantially more if he provides his measurement to the supplier. 
Definition 1 (ε-differential privacy). An algorithm
Differential private algorithms produce indistinguishable outputs for similar inputs (more precisely, differing by a single entry), and thus, the modification of any single user's data in the dataset (including its removal or addition) changes the probability of any output only up to a multiplicative factor e ε . The parameter ε allows us to control the level of privacy. Lower values of ε implies stronger privacy, as they restrict further the influence of a user's data on the output. Note that this model guarantees privacy for a user even if all other users' data is known to the adversary (e.g., it knows all measurements comprising the aggregate except the target user's), like when N −1 out of N users are malicious and cooperate with the supplier. The definition of differential privacy also maintains a composability property: the composition of differential private algorithms remains differential private and their ε parameters are accumulated. In particular, a protocol having t rounds, where each round is individually ε differential private, is itself t·ε differential private.
Output perturbation: achieving differential privacy
Let's say that we want to publish in a differentially private way the output of a function f . The following theorem says that this goal can be achieved by perturbing the output of f ; simply adding a random noise to the value of f , where the noise distribution is carefully calibrated to the global sensitivity of f , results in ε-differential privacy. The global sensitivity of a function is the maximum "change" in the value of the function when its input differs in a single entry. For instance, if f is the sum of all its inputs, the sensitivity is the maximum value that an input can take. , resp. The nodes want differential privacy for the released sums with at least a ε = 0.5. Based on Theorem 1, they need to add L(λ = maxi t X i t /0.5 = 1200) noise to the released sum in each slot. This noise ensures ε = t X 1 t /λ = 0.5 individual indistinguishability for U1, ε = 0.42 for U2, and ε = 0.17 for U3. Hence, the global ε = 0.5 bound is guaranteed to all. Another interpretation is that U1 has ε1 = X 1 1 /λ = 0.25, ε2 = X 1 2 /λ = 0.25 privacy in each individual slot, and ε = ε1 + ε2 = 0.5 considering all two slots following from the composition property of differential privacy.
Theorem 1 ([7]). For all
f : D → R r , the following mechanism A is ε-differential private: A(D) = f (D) + L(S(f )/ε), where L(S(f )/ε) is
Utility definition
Let f : D → R. In order to measure the utility, we quantify the difference between f (D) and its perturbed value (i.e.,f (D) = f (D) + L(λ)) which is the error introduced by LPA (Laplacian Perturbation Algorithm). A common scale-dependant error measure is the Mean Absolute Error (MAE), which is E|f (D) −f (D)| in our case. However, the error should be dependent on the non-perturbed value of f (D); if f (D) is greater, the added noise becomes small compared to f (D) which intuitively results in better utility. Hence, we rather use a slightly modified version of a scale-independent metric called Mean Absolute Percentage Error (MAPE), which shows the proportion of the error to the data, as follows.
Definition 2 (Error function). Let
D t ∈ D denote a dataset in time-slot t. Further- more, let δ t = |f (Dt)−f (Dt)| f (Dt)+1 (i.e.,
the value of the error in slot t). The error function is defined as µ(t) = E(δ t ). The expectation is taken on the randomness off (D t ).
The standard deviation of the error is σ(t) = Var (δ t ) in time t.
In the rest of this paper, the terms "utility" and "error" are used interchangeably.
Secure aggregation without aggregator: an overview
Our scheme enables the supplier to calculate the sum of maximum N measurements (i.e., N i=1 X i t = X t in all t) coming from N different smart meters while ensuring ε-differential privacy for each user. This is guaranteed if the supplier can only access
3 is the Laplacian noise calibrated to ε as it has been described in Section 3.4.
A simple solution would be to rely on an aggregator that aggregates the N samples and adds Laplacian noise before forwarding the result to the supplier. Although this scheme would be differential private, it only works if the aggregator is trusted. In particular, the scheme will not be secure if the aggregator omits to add the noise.
Our scheme, instead, does not rely on any centralized aggregator. The noise is added by each smart meter on their individual data and encrypted in such a way that the aggregator can only compute the (noisy) aggregate. Note that with our approach the aggregator and the supplier do need to be separate entities. The supplier can even play the role of the aggregator, as the encryption prevents it to access individual measurements, and the distributed generation of the noise ensures that it cannot manipulate the noise. Our proposal is composed of 2 main steps: distributed generation of the Laplacian noise and encryption of individual measurements. These 2 steps are described in the remainder of this section.
Distributed noise generation: a new approach
In our proposal, the Laplacian noise is generated in a fully distributed way as is illustrated in Figure 4 . We use the following lemma that states that the Laplace distribution is divisible and be constructed as the sum of i.i.d. gamma distributions. As this divisibility is infinite, it works for arbitrary number of users. λ) ], where G 1 (n, λ) and G 2 (n, λ) are i.i.d. random variables having gamma distribution with PDF g(x, n, λ) =
Lemma 1 (Divisibility of Laplace distribution [13]). Let L(λ) denote a random variable which has a Laplace distribution with PDF
The lemma comes from the fact that L(λ) can be represented as the difference of two i.i.d exponential random variables with rate parameter 1/λ. Moreover, λ) due to the summation property of the gamma distribution 4 . Here, G 1 (1, λ) and G 2 (1, λ) are i.i.d exponential random variable with rate parameter 1/λ which completes the argument.
Our distributed sanitization algorithm is simple; user i calculates valueX
in slot t and sends it to the aggregator, where G 1 (N, λ) and G 2 (N, λ) denote two random values independently drawn from the same gamma distribution. Now, if the aggregator sums up all values received from the N users of a cluster, then
The utility of our distributed scheme is defined as
, and δ(t) = λ Xt+1 . 4 The sum of i.i.d. gamma random variables follows gamma distribution (i.e.,
Encryption
The previous step is not enough to guarantee privacy as only the sum of the measurements (i.e.,X t ) is differential private but not the individual measurements. In particular, the aggregator has access toX i t , and even ifX i t is noisy, G 1 (N, λ) − G 2 (N, λ) is usually insufficient to provide reasonable privacy for individual users if N ≫ 1. This is illustrated in Figure 2 , where an individual's noisy and original measurements slightly differ. To address this problem, each contribution is encrypted using a modulo additionbased encryption scheme, inspired by [5] , such that the aggregator can only decrypt the sum of the individual values, and cannot access any of them. In particular, let k i denote a random key generated by user i inside a cluster such that N i=1 k i = 0, and k i is not known to the aggregator. Furthermore, Enc() denotes a probabilistic encryption scheme such that Enc(p, k, m) = p + k mod m, where p is the plaintext, k is the encryption key, and m is a large integer. The adversary cannot decrypt any Enc(X i t , k i , m), since it does not know k i , but it can easily retrieve the noisy sum by adding the encrypted noisy measurements of all users;
. The generation of k i is described in Section 5.2.
Protocol description
System setup
In our scheme, nodes are grouped into clusters of size N , where N is a parameter. The protocol requires the establishment of pairwise keys between each pair of nodes inside a cluster that can be done by using traditional Diffie-Hellman key exchange as follows. When a node v i is installed, it provides a self-signed DH component and its certificate to the supplier. Once all the nodes of a cluster are installed, or a new node is deployed, the supplier broadcasts the certificates and public DH components of all nodes. Finally, each node v i of the cluster can compute a pairwise key K i,j shared with any other node v j in the networks.
Smart meter processing
Each node v i sends at time t its periodic measurement, X N, λ)−G 2 (N, λ) , where G 1 (N, λ) and G 2 (N, λ) denote two random values independently drawn from the same gamma distribution and N is the cluster size. Phase 2 (Data encryption): Each noisy dataX i t is then encrypted into Enc(X i t ) using the modulo addition-based encryption scheme detailed in Section 4.2. The following extension is then applied to generate the encryption keys: Each node, v i , selects ℓ other nodes randomly, such that if v i selects v j , then v j also selects v i . Afterwards, both nodes generate a common dummy key k from their pairwise key K i,j ; v i adds k to Enc(X i t ) and v j adds −k to Enc(X j t ). As a result, the aggregator cannot decrypt the individual ciphertexts (it does not know the dummy key k). However, it adds all the ciphertexts of a given cluster, the dummy keys cancel out and it retrieves the encrypted sum of the (noisy) contributions. The more formal description is as follows:
1. node v i selects some nodes of the cluster randomly (we call them participating nodes) using a secure pseudo random function (PRF) such that if
to a value between 0 and 1 is less or equal than w N −1 , where r 1 is a public value changing in each slot. We denote by ℓ the number of selected participating nodes, and ind i [j] (for j = 1, . . . , ℓ) denotes the index of the ℓ nodes selected by node v i . Note that, for the supplier, the probability that
as it does not know K i,j . The expected value of ℓ is w.
v i computes for each of its ℓ participating nodes a dummy key. A dummy key
between v i and v j is defined as
, where K i,j is the key shared by v i and v j , and r 2 = r 1 is public value changing in each slot. Note that dkey i,j = −dkey j,i .
v i then computes Enc(X
where K ′ i is the keystream shared by v i and the aggregator which can be established using the DH protocol as above, and m is a large integer (see [5] ). Note that m must be larger than the sum of all contributions (i.e., final aggregate) plus the Laplacian noise. 
Supplier processing
Phase 1 (Data aggregation): At each slot, the supplier aggregates the N measurements received from the cluster smart meters by summing them, and obtains
In particular, Enc(
Phase 2 (Data decryption):
The aggregator then decrypts the aggregated value by subtracting the sum of the node's keystream, and retrieves the sum of the noisy measures:
where
The main idea of the scheme is that the aggregator is not able to decrypt the individual encrypted values because it does not know the dummy keys. However, by adding the different encrypted contributions, dummy keys cancel each other and the aggregator can retrieve the sum of the plaintext. The resulting plaintext is then the perturbed sums of the measurements, where the noise ensures the differential privacy of each user.
Complexity: Let b denote the size of the pairwise keys (i.e., K i,j ). Our scheme has O(N · b) storage complexity, as each node needs to store ℓ ≤ N pairwise keys. The computational overhead is dominated by the encryption and the key generation complexity. The encryption is composed of ℓ ≤ N modular addition of log 2 m bits long integers, while the key generation needs the same number of PRF executions. This results in a complexity of O(N · (log 2 m + c(b))), where c(b) is the complexity of the applied PRF function. 
Adding robustness
We have assumed so far that all the N nodes of a cluster participated in the protocol. However, it might happen that, for several different reasons (e.g., node or communication failures) some nodes are not able to participate in each epoch. This would have two effects: first, security will be reduced since the sum of the noise added by each node will not be equivalent to L(λ). Hence, differential privacy may not be guaranteed. Second, the aggregator will not be able to decrypt the aggregated value since the sum of the dummy keys will not cancel out.
In this section, we extend our scheme to resist node failures. We propose a scheme which resists the failure of up to M out of N nodes, where M is a configuration parameter. We will study later the impact of the value M on the scheme performance.
Sanitization phase extension
In order to resist the failure of M nodes, each node should add the following noise to their individual measurement:
. Therefore, this sanitization algorithm remains differential private, if at least N − M nodes participate in the protocol. Note that in that case each node adds extra noise to the aggregate in order to ensure differential privacy even if fewer than M nodes fail to send their noise share to the aggregator.
Encryption phase extension
The encryption phase consists of two rounds. In the first round, each node adds a secret random value to its encrypted value before releasing it. In the second round, every node reveals its random value along with the missing dummy keys that it knows:
where C i is the secret random key of v i generated randomly in each round. 2. After receiving all measurements, the aggregator asks all nodes for their random keys and the missing dummy keys through broadcasting the id of the non-responding nodes. 3. Each node v i verifies whether any ids in this broadcast message are in its participating node list, where the set of the corresponding participating nodes is denoted by S. Then, v i replies with j∈S dkey i,indi[j] + C i (mod m).
The aggregator subtracts all received values from
, as the random keys as well as the dummy keys cancel out.
The main idea of this scheme is that C i prevents the supplier to recoverX i t by combining the messages of nodes. Indeed, if v i did not add C i to its messages in Step 1 and 3, the supplier could easily getX i t by subtracting the responses of v i 's participating nodes (and K ′ i that it knows), received in Step 3, from Enc(X i t ), which is received in Step 1. However, since the supplier does not know the random keys, it cannot remove them from any messages but only from the final aggregate; subtracting the response of each node, received in Step 3, from the aggregate, all the dummy keys and secret random keys cancel out and the supplier obtainsX t . Although the supplier can still recoverX i t if it knows v i 's participating nodes (the supplier simply asks for all the dummy keys of v i in Step 2 and subtracts v i 's response in Step 4 from Enc(X i t )), this probability can be made practically small by adjusting w and N correctly (see [1] 
for details).
Utility evaluation If all N nodes participate in the protocol, the added noise will be larger than L(λ) which is needed to ensure differential privacy. In particular, The derivation can be found in the full version of this paper [1] . Based on Theorem
It is easy to check that σ(t) is always less or equal than µ(t). In particular, if α = 0 (there are no malicious nodes and node failures), then σ(t) = µ(t). If α > 0 then σ(t) < µ(t) but σ(t) ≈ µ(t).
Simulation results
Electricity trace simulator
Due to the lack of high-resolution real world data, we implemented an electricity trace simulator that can generate realistic one-minute resolution synthetic consumption traces. It is an extended version of the simulator developed in [19] . The simulator includes 33 different appliances. A trace is associated to a household and generated as follows: (1) A number of active persons is selected according to some distribution derived from real statistics. This number may vary as some members can enter or leave the house. (2) A set of appliances is then selected and activated at different time of the day according to an other distribution, which was also derived from real statistics.
Using this simulator, we generated 3000 electricity traces corresponding to different households, where the number of residents in each household was randomly selected between 1 and 5. Each trace was then sanitized according to our scheme. The noise added in each slot (i.e., λ(t)) was set to the maximum consumption in the slot (i.e., λ(t) = max 1≤i≤N X i t where the maximum is taken on all users in the cluster). This amount of noise ensures ε = 1 indistinguishability for individual measurements in all slots. Although one can increase λ(t) to get better privacy, the error will also increase. Note that the error µ ε ′ (t) for other ε ′ = ε values if µ ε (t) is given is µ ε ′ (t) = ε ε ′ · µ ε (t). We assume that λ(t) = max i X i t is known a priori.
Performance analysis: error according to the cluster size
The error introduced by our scheme depends on the cluster size N . In this section, we present how the error varies according to N . Table 1 shows the average error value and its standard deviation, resp., depending on the size of the cluster in case of different values of α. The average error of a given cluster size N is the average of mean t (µ(t)) of all N -sized clusters 7 . Obviously, higher N causes smaller error. Furthermore, a high α results in larger noise added by each meters, as described in Section 6, which also implies larger error. Interestingly, increasing the sampling period (i.e., T p ) results in slight error decrease 8 , hence, we only considered 10 min sampling period. Otherwise noted explicitly, we assume 10 min sampling period in the sequel. Table 1 . The error depending on N and α using random clustering. The sampling period is 10 min.
Privacy evaluation
Privacy over multiple slots So far, we have considered the privacy of individual slots, i.e. added noise to guarantee ε = 1 privacy in each slot of size 10 minutes. However, a trace is composed of several slots. For instance, if a user watches TV during multiple slots, we have guaranteed that an adversary cannot tell if the TV is watched in any particular slot (up to ε = 1). However, by analysing s consecutive slots corresponding to a given period, it may be able to tell whether the TV was watched during that period (the privacy bound of this is ε s = ε · s due to the composition property of differential privacy). Based on Theorem 1, we need to add noise λ(t) = s i=1 max i X i t to each aggregate to guarantee ε s = 1 bound in consecutive s slots, which, of course, results in higher error than in the case of s = 1 that we have assumed so far. Obviously, using the LPA technique, we cannot guarantee reasonably low error if s increases, as the necessary noise λ(t) = s i=1 max i X i t can be large. In order to keep the error λ(t)/ N i=1 X i t low while ensuring better privacy than ε s = s · ε, one can increase the number of users inside each cluster (i.e., N ).
Let's say that we want to compute the privacy of a user i between 14:00 and 18:00. If ε(t) = X i t /λ(t) denotes the bound in a single slot t, then, based on the composition property of differential privacy, the bound ε s for the s = 24 slots between 14:00 (84th slot) and 18:00 (108th slot) is 108 t=84 ε(t). In general, ε s (t) = t+s i=t ε(i). Table 2 shows what average privacy of a user, in our dataset, as a function of the cluster size and value s. As the cluster size increases, the privacy bound decreases (i.e. privacy increases). The reason is that when the cluster size increases, the maximum consumption also increases with high probability. Since the noise is calibrated according to the maximum consumption within the cluster, it will be larger. This results in better privacy. Table 2 . εs of users considering all appliances depending on N and s. Tp is 10 min.
Privacy of appliances
In the previous section, we analysed how a user's privacy varies over time. In this section, we consider the privacy of the different appliances. For example, we aim at answering the following question: what was my privacy when I was watching TV last evening between 18:00 and 20:00? In order to compute the corresponding privacy (i.e. ε s ), we compute 120 t=108 ε(t), where ε(t) = {TV's consumption in t}/λ(t). We summarized some of the appliance privacy 9 in Table 3 . Each value is computed by averaging the privacy provided in our 3000 traces.
The appliances can be divided into two major groups: the usage of active appliances indicate that the user is at home and uses the appliance (their consumption significantly changes during their active usage such as iron, vacuum, kettle, etc.), whereas passive appliances (like fridge, freezers, storage heater, etc.) have more or less identical consumption regardless the user is at home or not. Table 3 . εs of different appliances in case of different s. N = 100 and Tp is 10 min. The name of active devices are in bold.
Previous tables show two different, and conflicting, results. Table 2 shows that it may actually be difficult to hide the presence of activities in a household. In fact, computed ε values are quite high, even for large clusters. However, results presented in Table 3 are more encouraging. They show that, although, it might be difficult to hide a user's presence, it is still possible to hide his actual activity. In fact, appliances privacy bounds (ε values) are quite small, which indicates that an adversary will have difficulty telling whether the user is, for example, using his computer or watching TV during a given period of time. Furthermore, results show that it is even more difficult for an adversary to tell when a given activity actually started. Finally, we recall that in order to keep the error λ(t)/ N i=1 X i t low while ensuring better privacy one can always increase the number of users inside each cluster. For instance, doubling N from 100 to 200 allows to double the noise while keeping approximately the same error value (0.118 in Table 1 if 
